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TOWARD A CRITICAL THEORY OF UNTIDY GEOGRAPHIES: THE SPATIALITY OF EMOTIONS IN CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION

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ABSTRACT

This paper offers a non-essentialist, normative view of the spatiality of emotions in consumption and production, underscoring issues of difference in everyday life. As people interweave thoughts and feelings across spheres of life, over time, economic and noneconomic logics become blurred, leading to multiple, often conflicting sentiments. Cognitive dissonance is not necessarily resolved and manifests in incoherent consumer practices. Understanding individuals' often covert *dis*articulation from communities can help proactively uncover avenues for expressing agency within structures of constraint. The geographies of multiple logics also clarify behavior in production regarding thoughts and feelings emanating from outside the workplace. Managers can use this knowledge to achieve competitiveness by accommodating workers' needs and nurturing collaboration, tapping overlapping social networks across time and space. Thinking normatively about the spatiality of emotions requires analytical fluidity to relate context-specific and mobile, mutable processes. The process-oriented framework developed here is intended to complement, not replace, pattern-oriented analysis.

KEYWORDS

Critical theory, non-essentialism, spatiality, emotions, epistemology, normative thought

JEL Codes: B59, D8, Z1

PROBLEM

This paper develops a conceptual framework to place emotion in the economy, specifically in the daily life of consumer society and in production, with an eye towards using this understanding to bring about positive, inclusive change. As I will elaborate, the framework I develop here lies at the interstices of different, sometimes overlapping bodies of literature. I begin with two brief fictitious anecdotes to highlight common daily-life issues often neglected by people engaged in social interaction as well as by academicians who study such contexts.

Sue lives in a largely white, middle-class suburban neighborhood in America's heartland. Like most people in her neighborhood, she owns a house and partakes in much of the material culture of her neighborhood (cars, clothes, furniture). She appears to be very much embedded in her neighborhood – both a product of the neighborhood and an agent in reproducing local consumer society by virtue of her participation in it. Yet, unlike many of her neighbors, she has a lawn covered with dandelions. Why doesn't she use chemicals to rid her lawn of weeds like most other people in the neighborhood? When Sue moved into the area, she retained the open space between her house and her neighbors' houses, yet within just three years she had put up a privacy fence with an iron gate. Her front door features unique stained glass that she bought at a garage sale when she lived in another neighborhood. She has a nice dog with a lot of character, although he is unattractive: he is a mutt from the pound – not like the pedigree dogs found at most other homes in the neighborhood. She has an interesting weather vane on her house that is, however, dysfunctional (it was her mother's). Most people in the neighborhood don't know Sue very well. She works outside the neighborhood and doesn't socialize much; she does not seem to be very congenial and is sometimes even ill-tempered. For example, the other day one of her neighbors, Sam, commented to her that the neighborhood seemed to be changing, noting in particular all the Hispanics working at the restaurants and construction sites. They seemed to be "all around," and Sam wondered if some of them might actually move in. Sue just stammered something and went inside. Sam wondered how Sue might vote on the new community proposals to require hospital emergency rooms and city offices to report illegal immigrants.

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Maria lives with and cares for her mother, who is very ill. Whereas most of Maria's colleagues in her office have stay-at-home partners to cover domestic responsibilities, Maria does not, and she spends her evenings and weekends tending her mother. Unlike many of her colleagues, Maria does not work beyond the formal workday. This has meant that she cannot take on additional projects that would likely lead to tangible and intangible benefits such as salary raises, an expanded social and professional network, and so forth. Some of Maria's colleagues assume that she is not as serious about work as they are because she spends fewer hours per day on workplace matters. One day Maria asked her manager if he could spread out some of the more routine work that she does so that she could take on a project for which she was particularly well suited. The project involved cementing a deal with a well-established firm whose business would bring increased prestige to Maria's office. In addition to being conversant with the details of the proposed transaction and with the dynamics of the firm in question, Maria happened to know key personnel there. She had gone to school with Rob, the person from the firm who would lead the discussion on the

proposed transaction. Further, Maria knew she had Rob's respect: she and Rob had been classmates in school, and Maria had helped Rob in several classes. Other key personnel also had been classmates and buddies of Rob and had indirectly benefited from Maria's help. Maria explained the circumstances to her manager. He responded by saying that only the highest achievers at the office were eligible for this project and suggested uneasily that Maria had too many other things going on in her life. The project went to Jared, who was devoted entirely to his career, linked at present to the office. Unfortunately, Jared's approach to deal-making was overambitious, and this, combined with his puffed-up behavior, resulted in a pretentious presentation that perturbed Rob and his associates; further, Rob had assumed that he would be conducting business with Maria and was somewhat put off by what he considered to be Jared's displacement of Maria. The deal failed.

The two anecdotes above differ in context (neighborhood and workplace), but they share some important features.

First, both involve difference. Sue and Maria, although very much part of their respective contexts (neighborhood and workplace), also differ from others around them (neighbors and co-workers). This difference is evident in some of Sue's material culture and in the circumstances surrounding Maria's work that negatively impact her prospects for assuming leadership on key projects. Maria seems a very capable person, more capable than many (with potentially positive consequences for her office), but her ''difference'' precludes her from realizing her potential. Sue's difference leads others to characterize her in ways that may misrepresent her and also elide the thoughts and feelings that underlie some of her behavior. In both cases, one wonders if a more sensitive understanding of circumstances of difference might have important and potentially positive consequences.

Second, both anecdotes reveal mixed thoughts and feelings – emotions – that are critical elements of social interaction and decision-making. Sue's interaction with her neighbor in the first anecdote was strained, and although Sam may have taken Sue's response as little more than a reflection of a bad mood or part of her personality, one might suppose from the rest of the information provided that Sue was uncomfortable with the racist tinge of Sam's comment. The success of the project that Maria requested also hinged on thoughts and feelings; one might suppose from the above information that business transactions can pivot on the nature of social interaction, in this instance on having respect for, or being put off by, the individuals engaged in the transaction.

Third, both anecdotes are about particular behaviors among people at a particular time and place, yet these behaviors and results of interaction are connected with the people's experiences across contexts – both space and time. Sue has not lived in her current neighborhood her entire life, and one might suppose that some of her consumer behavior and material

culture, if not her values, derive from experiences elsewhere at other times. One might similarly suppose that Maria's prospects for succeeding with the proposed business deal depended not only on her being intelligent, capable, and conversant with the details of the proposal, but also, and critically, on relationships and trust established in another part of her life – outside the workplace at another time.

Fourth, both anecdotes demonstrate that the thoughts and feelings bound up in experiences across many contexts have an impact on any one context. The first anecdote ends with the neighbor wondering how Sue will vote on community proposals. Indeed, the mixture of thoughts and feelings across time and space (including the current time and particular place) figures prominently in people's value systems and decision-making, a consideration that might be useful in thinking about individuals' propensities for political action. The second anecdote ends with a failed deal, suggesting that a more positive outcome may have been reached had Maria led the project. The message is that people and their thoughts and feelings count when weighing issues such as productivity and competitiveness. One might imagine parallel anecdotes addressing other types of issues, such as how best to secure commitment from workers in different workplaces to develop an effective protest against work conditions; in this case, the interaction among people and the way people feel about their jobs and one another are likely to figure prominently in effective organization.

Although many people might consider the above points to be a matter of common sense, somehow people in daily life as well as academicians who research behavior routinely disregard these points and the complex issues embedded in them. If they are common sense, then it is equally sensible to identify what drives the slighting process and what may be the consequences. Why do people in workplaces often make decisions that result in suboptimal productivity, competitiveness, or effectiveness? (Actually, how would we know, if paths not taken are unconsidered?) Why does social interaction in consumer society emphasize homogenizing tendencies rather than recognize difference and potentially use that difference fruitfully towards change? This paper focuses on processes that diverge from conventional patterns to complement traditional interpretations of realities.

POSITIONING

The anecdotes and brief discussion in the previous section highlight two principal, interrelated goals of this paper: relationally, to understand the formation and evolution of individuals' thoughts and feelings relative to social contexts, and normatively, to use that understanding to promote positive change, specifically in consumer culture[1] and production contexts. This paper develops a conceptual framework towards these ends.

Although behavioral economics is both relational and normative, it nonetheless differs from the framework I develop here. Behavioral economics weds cognitive studies in psychology with experimental economics to examine how individuals' thoughts and feelings figure in decision-making. Results in the aggregate reflect market trends and general patterns of behavior. The normative dimension of behavioral economics has to do with experimental economics' interest in prediction. Such prediction embraces deterministic thinking and the assumption that past trends govern future patterns. In contrast, my approach is nondeterministic and focuses on the contingent conditions under which a desired outcome may be possible. Further, I conceptualize behavior and decision-making as the result of thoughts and feelings that may be unconscious and/or conscious and that reflect an amalgam of thoughts and feelings associated with experiences in different contexts across space and time.

I interpret the world through several lenses, which represent bodies of literature that generally are understood discretely. My goals entail interweaving insights from these literatures. One lens is *feminist*, which emphasizes a fundamental concern with social justice and a political agenda directed towards inclusion. In particular I draw from *poststructuralist* feminism, which has a political agenda and is non-essentialist in its concern for theorizing difference, broadly construed across multiple axes.

The poststructuralist lens also highlights agency amid structures of constraint and thereby directs attention to everyday practices of power in people's lives,[2] as well as, normatively, to a societal critique. Although societal structures, institutions, and norms indeed are important, my concern is with the *relation* between these constraints and human agency. Michel Foucault's later work (1985) in particular focused on this relation,[3] and the political agenda of poststructuralist analyses has entailed recognizing that individuals can engage in subversive performances that represent a challenge to structures of constraint (see also, for example, Judith Butler 1990, 1997; Katharine Gibson 2001). My interest, however, is in whether subversive performances are or can be catalysts for significant change. My aim is to extend the understanding of political possibilities to proactive change. Variation and difference are windows on tension and flux that are overlooked in conventional understandings of culture as homogeneous, coherent, and unchanging. I suggest that identifying and understanding these windows are critical for constructing change. As Andrew Sturdy and Stephen Fineman (2001) have pointed out, open resistance on an individual scale presupposes structures that legitimize individuals' fears and anxieties. I wish to contribute to the literature on social change, notably the post-development literature on radical politics and social movements (Barbara Cruikshank 1999; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 2001; Jane Mansbridge 2001), by developing a framework to identify, understand, and proactively harness the energy embedded in

conflict *at the scale of individuals* when structures to legitimize fears and anxieties are absent. My question is, how might we understand an individual's disarticulation from her or his local work, social, family, avocational, and/or other communities, and how might we identify this disarticulation so that we can subsequently link it proactively to others' disarticulation and develop fruitful collective action? My starting point of analysis is prior to the advent of collective action, whether by ''new'' social movements organized along axes of identity politics such as women's or gay rights organizations (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) or by consumer activist groups (Yiannis Gabriel and Tim Lang 1995).

Another lens is *economic* because I am concerned with how people's thoughts and feelings evolve and (often unconsciously but potentially consciously and proactively) affect interactions in consumer cultures and workplaces. Although readers of this journal may take the importance of the economy for granted, the general neglect of the economy in poststructuralist literature (a conceptual source for this paper) suggests that it is important in principle to clarify why economies are crucial to any understanding of life: most people spend most of their daily lives in economic spheres, whether work or consumer spaces. Ironically, the poststructuralist literature, with its emphasis on the practices of power in everyday life, sidesteps these spheres of life, which encompass the majority of most people's time and space. I will go a step further: in light of the importance of the economy in most people's lives, it is difficult to imagine significant, long-term change (and processes associated with that change) that is not inextricably related to the economy. At issue is not just how poststructuralist thinking can contribute to studies of the economy, but how thinking through aspects of the economy can contribute to the poststructuralist literature. Regarding production, we know relatively little about flux and daily tensions in so-called ''normal'' or ''traditional'' industries, *not* because these phenomena are nonexistent but because they are outside the purview of conventional analysis.[4] Similarly, regarding consumption, we know little about how people associated with particular lifestyles can harbor divergent values, thoughts, and feelings, and the effects or potential effects of that divergence.

My *cultural* perspective on production and consumption is informed by the interrelated literatures on cultural industries and consumer cultures, yet it differs from them in three ways.[5] First, I am skeptical about the exclusiveness of a literature that focuses on cultural *industries* (assuming more of a production than a consumption vantage point). This literature adheres to the idea that select sectors, industries, firms, or workplaces are ''cultural,'' whereas others are not. Here ''culture'' refers to exclusive bodies of knowledge associated with, for example, the arts, aesthetics, fashion design, or film as a producer of images, and to alleged attributes of these bodies of knowledge such as creativity, bohemian life, and (pertinent

here) emotion (e.g., Raymond Williams 1961; Scott Lash and John Urry 1994; Jane Bryan, Steve Hill, Max Munday, and Annette Roberts 2000; Allen J. Scott 2000; Richard L. Florida 2002; Dominic Power 2002).[6] ''Culture'' in this literature denotes *what* is being produced. Alternatively, ''culture'' can refer to how and why goods or services *across* sectors, industries, firms, and workplaces are produced, marketed, and consumed. From this vantage point, *all* types of production construct images, play on emotions to connect with consumers, and use consumers' emotions in design. The idea that only film and related industries produce images overlooks the emotional content, for example, of automobiles, which tap and generate emotions associated with expressions of class, gender, and sexuality, not to mention commodified racism;[7] similar arguments can be made about everything from toys to fast food (Judith Williamson 1978; William Leiss, Stephen Kline, and Sut Jhally 1986; Raymond Williams 1993). From this perspective, at issue is how emotion pervades systems of production, consumption, and their relation; and how emotions intersect with the porous realm of ''economy'' (Doreen Massey 1997). Rather than denying ''cultural'' status to some (actually most) industries, I jettison the binary of cultural/noncultural. In a critical conception of culture, ''design'' also relates to more than select industries such as fashion. Design entails innovation in products and/or processes involved in the production of goods and services alike. Outside traditional Taylorist systems, incentives exist to encourage and institutionalize creativity among workers to insure a competitive advantage via quality control or innovation (Richard L. Florida 1996), and thus creativity applies to more than the few industries that intersect with ''art.'' This is true not just in formal alternatives to Taylorism: anyone can be creative, from blue- to pink- to white-collar workers. Creativity comes into play as people negotiate power and knowledge in daily life, and is, therefore, present even in Taylorist systems despite surveillance and suppression. Accordingly, I also jettison the implicitly elitist idea of a ''creative class'' associated with cultural industries and bohemian life (Florida 2002[8]).

Second, whereas the literature regards ''cultural'' industries and consumer cultures as emblematic of a particular stage of development or point in economic history, I am skeptical about the idea that the cultural in industry is novel or specific to a particular time period. Although categorizing overt government policy as ''cultural'' may be relatively new (e.g., Sharon Zukin 1997; Tou-Chuang Chang 2000), I regard the cultural in industry as a phenomenon extending across time and space. As in the case of so-called ''*new* social movements,''[9] the perceived novelty may reside more in the practice of study than in its subject. This temporal issue underscores an important difference (amid many similarities) between theories of postmodernity and poststructuralism. Whereas postmodern frameworks focus on what is *not* modern, and conceptually are organized

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around delineated contexts of time (usually linearly conceived) and space, poststructuralism is organized according to principles of thought that are applicable across contexts.[10] This said, the terms ''poststructuralist'' and ''postmodern'' are often used interchangeably in practice; thus, the distinctions between postmodernism and poststructuralism cited here refer to ideas expressed and not necessarily to labels, titles, and the like. Time as well as space can be pivotal in a poststructuralist framework, but with a focus on daily life, not delimitations by time periods or regions.[11] In this paper I approach time and space with reference to the following: the mixing of thoughts and feelings across contexts (over time and space); the relevance of this mixing for determining the relation between dominant norms and individualized difference in consumer cultures and production contexts; and the potential value of difference for social change.

   Third, I am skeptical about the idea of coherence that the literatures on cultural industries and consumer cultures emphasize in thinking about groups of people, lifestyles, and/or capitalism overall. David Harvey's (1989) concept of ''structured coherence'' epitomizes Marxist and general political economy approaches that tend to examine production over a period of time as a relatively coherent way of (economic-based) life, subsuming and in the process homogenizing the intricacies of daily life as well as variation in production systems and capital-labor relations (Ray Hudson 1989). Approaches to consumption similarly embrace the idea of coherence, yet with reference to modes of representation rather than modes of production (Jean Baudrillard 1983). Like Harvey's ''structured coherence,'' Pierre Bourdieu's (1977, 1984) concept of ''habitus'' posits relatively homogeneous lifestyles and consumer practices for classes or subclasses of people whose tastes are socially patterned. Revisiting the example of automobiles, a socio-spatial patterning of lifestyles and material culture does occur, as in ''high-rider'' (vehicles with high road clearance) sport utility vehicles (SUVs) in white, middle-class American suburbs and ''low riders'' (vehicles with low road clearance) in Hispanic neighborhoods, but such tidiness is unsettled by internal differentiation. Some television commercials, for example, suggest that real men drive SUVs while women drive minivans, contributing to a gender divide (along with class and personal identity) that slashes through the heart of suburban communities and their households, revealing different identities, values, and lifestyles associated with places that are either real or imagined.[12] Different people (a man and a woman, for example) from the same household may have jobs in different types of places or in different types of institutions, and they also may have different types of social networks associated with different sets of values (Susan Hanson and Geraldine Pratt 1995). Further, different people in a community may have different residential histories: some adults may have grown up in the communities in which they currently live or may come from similar communities, whereas others may have experienced life

in fundamentally different types of neighborhoods, either in the same metropolitan region or elsewhere. Thus, although some communities may abound in SUVs, for example, this representation of American suburban consumer culture whitewashes the less apparent diversity. On close examination, a local consumer culture reveals an incoherence in the symbols associated with its communities and households, as well as with individuals, suggesting, as in the case of Sue, covert disarticulation and conflict as well as social embeddedness and homogeneity. The consumption pattern of any one individual may reflect cognitive dissonance as much as conformity: an individual in a household may own an SUV, but perhaps having a residential history in a more diverse neighborhood, s/he may also have some of the accoutrements of an ethnic material culture outside the current frame. An unresolved cognitive dissonance reflects multiple logics that derive from experiences in different contexts, challenging presumptions of ultimate or inevitable conformity. The tantalizing issue that arises out of conflict or difference amid conformity or homogeneity is the potential for purposefully tapping such tension to change socially or environmentally destructive practices and community pathways.

Thus, whereas socio-spatial patterning does occur, also pertinent are variation and the multitude of nonconforming cases that are too important to suppress by implicitly or explicitly conceptualizing them as exceptions, outliers, deviants, and residuals, or more generally as analytical noise. Although studies of consumption in particular often emphasize daily practice (Daniel Miller 1998), which can account for variation, analysis nonetheless often focuses on ''modes of operation or schemata of action, and not directly the subjects (or persons) who are their authors or vehicles'' (Michel de Certeau 1984: xi). As I will elaborate in the next section, I wish to foreground human actors, *people*, and their relations.

Finally, another lens is *geographic,* which may be less familiar to much of the audience of this journal. Geography and difference (often defined in terms of a particular axis, such as gender, class, or race) actually share an unfortunate analytical history in that both have been treated as an extra variable that may be added on to analysis. The critical alternative is to recognize difference and geography as lenses through which to view the world, and accordingly they require a holistic reconceptualization of issues, not the addition of variables .[13] I suggest that a geographic lens is crucial to linking the formation and evolution of individuals' thoughts and feelings with social interactions in particular contexts, such as consumer cultures and workplaces. In the introduction to the second edition of *Emotion in Organizations,* Stephen Fineman (2000a) calls for such a linkage (specifically between psychoanalytic and social constructivist[14] approaches), notably in the context of workplaces. However, although the individual chapters in his edited collection bring an unconventional understanding of emotions to the study of organizational behavior – namely, that emotion is

integrally related to its commonly presumed antithesis, rationality – Fineman's book nonetheless represents an array of distinct approaches to emotions in organizations, none of which individually integrates psychoanalytic and social constructivist approaches; the linkage of individual thoughts and feelings with social interaction that he calls for remains forthcoming. This paper conceptualizes that linkage through a geographic lens.

Of the different modes of geographic thinking, I am concerned with the one broadly understood in terms of ''spatiality.'' Unlike ''location,'' which is a Cartesian matter of latitudinal/ longitudinal fixes and related *patterns*, spatiality concerns *processes* that occur across space and over time, and are integrally related to social relations – not by cause and effect (e.g., action has spatial effect) but rather by being inextricably bound up in one another. Thus, understanding social relations requires understanding processes of the space economy and vice versa (Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory 1997; Doreen Massey, John Allen, and Philip Sarre 1999). Studies of spatiality have addressed psychoanalytic issues (Steve Pile 1996; Heidi J. Nast 2000) and, separately, social relations, including gender in production contexts (Massey 1997); the linkage of individual thoughts and feelings with socio-economic contexts is, however, undeveloped. As I explain in the next section, this linkage requires spatializing a non-essentialist perspective.

NON-ESSENTIALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITS SPATIALITY

I begin with a cue from poststructuralist principles, specifically the idea of non-essentialism, which suggests that phenomena are multidimensional and thus cannot be encapsulated by any one dimension of life (e.g., Donna Haraway 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). This perspective blurs the conventional boundaries of the economic, political, social, cultural, psychological, ecological, and so forth. Each of these spheres is integrally related to other spheres of life; there is no Economy, for example, but econom*ies* that are also critically political, social, cultural, and so forth.[15] Feminists in particular have used non-essentialism in arguments for appreciating difference, rejecting concise summations of, for example, ''woman,'' ''African American,'' ''homosexual,'' and so on, in favor of an approach that recognizes differences among women, African Americans, and others (bell hooks 1990; Chela Sandoval 1991; Shaun Hargreaves Heap 2001). A non-essentialist perspective on contexts would decry characterizations of places as ''developed,'' ''undeveloped,'' or ''underdeveloped'' in light of the multiple, hybrid realities occurring in a given place (Arturo Escobar 1995; Nancy Ettlinger 1999). Similarly, a non-essentialist view of emotions would reject binaries such as rationality/emotion and regard thoughts and feelings as continuous (Stephen Fineman 1993, 2000b;

Massey 1997). This view thus rejects essentialist forms (such as ''love,'' ''anger,'' and ''compassion'') that represent emotions as apart from, or in relation to, rationality.[16]

Following the non-essentialist perspective developed in Fineman's volumes, I suggest that *multiple logics* (Nancy Ettlinger 2003) exist, each of which encompasses continuous thoughts and feelings with no separation between rationality and emotion, and no binary of rational and irrational. For example, a person's decision to hold onto a car or piece of furniture or weather vane (as in the anecdote about Sue) despite its dysfunction and despite the person's financial ability to replace it is not irrational; rather it is intelligible in terms of a logic that attributes value to the commodity based on the thoughts and feelings associated with it, possibly developed in other contexts. Similarly, a manager who opts for a suboptimal solution regarding efficiency is irrational only if one accepts the ''rational man'' logic of economics; s/he may be more comfortable with a less efficient solution due to a variety of life experiences. The value attached to that solution makes sense according to a logic based on something other than efficiency. The anecdote about Maria shows how some logics may have negative effects. The fluidity of emotions across time and space points back to experiences in different contexts that then intermingle in the mind and affect behavior and social interaction.

Although geographers influenced by poststructuralism routinely think in non-essentialist terms regarding contexts and categories such as race and gender, the *spatiality* of non-essentialism to date lacks explicit theorization beyond a critique of Torsten Hägerstrand's ''time-geography'' (see Allan Pred 1977 for a useful commentary on Torsten Hägerstrand's work and contributions). Whereas time-geography recognizes time as well as space and represents persons' movements across time and space visually and quantitatively against what is understood as an objective and unilateral understanding of time and space, a cultural critique emphasizes subjectivities and multiple understandings of time and space that are laced with power relations (as in the case of a person positioned in time and space by virtue of the needs of others) (Karen Davies 2001; Martin Gren 2001). I concur with this critique, and wish to extend a non-essentialist perspective beyond the actors to space itself. Specifically, I suggest that we should not essentialize and thereby separate spaces, or spheres, of life such as the private, the public, home, community, workplace, and so on. Despite physical as well as symbolic distances, and tangible as well as intangible boundaries (Hanson and Pratt 1995; Pratt 1999), people carry their thoughts and feelings, mixing them as they traverse contexts over time. ''Context'' refers here to the set of thoughts and feelings, behaviors, social interactions, institutions, and structures in a place, where ''place'' can signify a locality understood in Cartesian terms, a virtual place in cyberspace, and/or a symbolic place such as a plaza or church or workplace

that is present in many localities yet connected across space through practices, discourses, and networks. From this vantage point, a workplace is not necessarily fixed in space when the ''work'' hinges on interpersonal interaction that may occur across space via telecommunications. Further, individual people are concurrently members of multiple social networks, across different spheres of life (work, residential community, leisure-related communities), suggesting that people unconsciously interweave multiple logics, that is, modes of thought and feeling associated with different spheres of life and different social networks. This untidiness defies conventional notions of a prevailing logic or rationality in any one sphere of life, such as the home, the workplace, the community, or the shopping mall. Rather than an end product of linear thinking that moves along a predefined axis of ''rationality,'' behavior emerges from a kaleidoscope of emotions and calculations that span a variety of private and public spheres of life. Private feelings affect public decision-making and vice versa. The main point is not the absence of geography; rather multiple geographies must be traced across spheres of life, over time, to make sense of behavior and interpersonal as well as interorganizational interaction.

The relation between the multidimensionality of phenomena and the multiple geographies of people's thoughts and feelings suggests two epistemological departures. First, frameworks that feature multidimensionality and fluidity tend to elide the individual actors' contexts, whether the actors are human or nonhuman. They tend to focus on relations, often at the expense of the contexts of the people (or nonhuman actors) who are engaged in the relations; the ''unit'' of analysis is typically the network or flow.[17] In this paper, I specifically wish to foreground human actors and the significance of the thoughts and feelings they carry and mix across contexts and social networks. This approach implies *two* centers of analysis: people and their relations. The *analysis* itself is fluid, moving between nodes (people) and their relations. Fixing the analysis on a particular unit jeopardizes our understanding. If the analysis is fixed on nodes, it misses the effects of relations; if it is fixed on relations (a network within places or across space, flows, or a trajectory over time), then it reifies relations and obscures the complexity of context that could help clarify critical differences as well as commonalities in social life.[18] Analytically, our task entails recognizing the significance of each context as well as its relations. The relation between text and context connects the symbolic or representational with the material to reflect geographies of thought and feeling.[19]

People's multiple geographies, the associated multiple logics, and the concomitant interweaving of thoughts and feelings in different contexts make it difficult if not inadvisable to categorize people or groups by types of lifestyles or according to circumscribed networks. Individuals and their perceptions, emotions, behavior, and decisions often are more complex

than their class or occupation or gender or ethnicity or residential neighborhood (or symbols of any of these axes of difference) may suggest.[20] Although lifestyles and social patterning are critical elements of behavior and interaction, I foreground not lifestyles but instead the people engaged in what may seem like a formulaic lifestyle on the surface, by virtue of some symbols, but what on closer examination may be constituted by multiple and possibly conflicting symbols and practices, as in the anecdotes about Sue and Maria.

I consider that individuals may routinely experience cognitive dissonance. The theory of cognitive dissonance from mainstream psychology recognizes conflicted thoughts and feelings at the same time that it dispels the conflict by presuming resolution as individuals discard one set of thoughts and feelings to permit a conforming set to take over in its place (Leon Festinger 1957[21]). Yet, what a conceit, to presume that conflicted feelings inevitably will be resolved! Further, why presume that conflicted feelings are necessarily a problem in need of resolution? If we deconstruct consumer cultures, commonly considered representative of relatively homogenized lifestyles, we find individuals, such as Sue in the initial anecdote, who reflect conformity in some respects and non-conformity in others. Although Gabriel and Lang (1995), in their landmark work *The Unmanageable Consumer: Contemporary Consumption and its Fragmentations,* recognize both considerable variation amid seemingly homogenized norms as well as the agency of consumers to diverge from prescribed norms, they nonetheless view individuals' lifestyles as integrated and coherent (Gabriel and Lange 1995: 93). The approach developed here departs from this view and embraces the non-essentialist perspective that understands identities as fluid (see especially Chapter 3 of Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Specifically, the framework here conceptualizes individuals' practices as *in*coherent with reference to the intermingling of thoughts and feelings that derive from their experiences across time and space, and the often conflicting values embedded in these geographies. Accepting that dissonance is not necessarily resolved (that individuals do not necessarily eliminate one attitude or set of thoughts and emotions to relieve friction among conflicting views), we know relatively little about how individuals' cognitive dissonance and the associated consumption and production practices articulate and also *dis*articulate within the variety of public and private communities or networks to which they belong.

At issue is not the importance of individual conflict over social patterning, but rather the relation between flux and tension, on the one hand, and sets of social patterns, on the other. Disarticulation is interesting because it both helps explain inconsistencies and, conceivably though certainly not inevitably, may lead to change; it is a potential gateway for the expression of agency in the midst of structures of constraint.

A second epistemological path follows from the interconnectivity of the thoughts and feelings that derive from different contexts: ''making sense'' of behavior is not a matter of prediction (Sheila Dow and John Hillard 1995). The suggestion here is that interpreting realities requires describing the pathways, or the geographies, of behavior and/or theorizing the contingent conditions under which particular behaviors and circumstances are possible. The foundational ''rational man'' in business practice as well as basic research on production is an attempt to determine precisely what will and will not happen, thereby eliminating uncertainty. Yet, attention to the role of emotions in the workplace reveals the certainty of uncertainty and moreover, as seen in the anecdote about Maria, the negative consequences for workers as well as employers of ignoring a part of life that is present in all spheres. Here I take cues from, and try to build on, the work of feminist economists such as Nancy Folbre (1994, 2001) who have reconceptualized the economy by recognizing the value and roles of nonwage-earning, notably caring, work in domestic spheres conventionally regarded as private. Epistemologically, so-called ''irrational'' behavior and decision-making, as underscored by Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio (1995), are more than residuals or variables to add on to an analysis; rather these phenomena are embedded in uncertainty and the problems of prediction, which requires that we interpret the world with these issues in mind.

While the processes associated with production and consumption differ, as do their respective avenues for social change, the spatiality of social life in these different realms shares common ground. The certainty of uncertainty in production derives from individuals' intermingling of thoughts and feelings in the workplace with thoughts and feelings from other spheres of life (e.g., home, neighborhood, and local or nonlocal associations). As people carry and mix their thoughts and feelings across contexts and boundaries, workplaces become stages on which cognitive dissonance (understood here as *actively* conflicting thoughts and feelings that are traceable to different contexts and social relations) play themselves out. The geographies of multiple logics similarly figure in consumption; this fluidity materializes in particular consumer contexts in the form of incoherent consumer practices.

Untidy geographies and their associated multiple logics help clarify individuals' problems and conflicts in the multiple communities and social networks to which they belong, whether in workplaces, homes, neighborhoods, or nonspatially circumscribed vocational, nonvocational, or kin-based communities. Knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the spatiality of individuals' thoughts and feelings, and the constructive harnessing of conflict, suggest normative possibilities on which I will elaborate in the following sections, first on consumption and then on production.

THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF *IN*COHERENT CONSUMER CULTURES

Despite the appearance of a tidy geography of metropolitan lifestyles and provocative frameworks to conceptualize and explain such geographies (Allen J. Scott 1988a),[22] communities are nonetheless internally differentiated and constituted by hybrid, often divergent realities; they are rarely inclusive, making it a mistake to reify communities as if they represent unified actors or lifestyles (Lynn A. Staeheli and Albert Thompson 1997). As indicated previously, my position is that variation and difference within communities are as important as dominant patterns. Also as indicated, individuals' incoherent and variable consumer cultures are reflections of the implicit diversity within seemingly homogeneous communities; each individual's consumer practices reference thoughts and feelings that derive from the variety of contexts or spheres of life that each traverses.

Beyond their descriptive value, variation and difference conceivably may contribute to social change. Apparently minority views or behaviors are often symbolically louder or more visible than conventional views or behaviors that may require little if any discussion or publicity by virtue of their mainstream status. Minority sentiments may be an important avenue along which social change can occur, although such sentiments easily remain and routinely *are* untapped. Herein lies the *potential* value of cognitive dissonance: conflictive thoughts and feelings can be tapped and used to construct alternatives to community practices. My interests are in the normative value of incoherent thoughts and feelings, and further, in connecting individuals' conflictive feelings with social relations that may enable social change.[23] My purpose here is to build on the literature of social movements by addressing a relatively unexplored question.

The social movement literature has shown that the effectiveness of a movement, whether regarding class or identity issues or labor conditions, often is predicated on the broadening of its goals and the development of coalitions, that is, linkages between people in different communities (Manuel Castells 1983; Sonia E. Alvarez 1990; Marc Edelman 1998; George Yúdice 1998; Fernando J. Bosco 2001, 2002; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Nancy Ettlinger 2002) or between a community and the state[24] (John S. Dryzek 1996; Michael Brown 1997; Iris M. Young 2000). ''Community'' is a relative term, referring to a group sharing common interests or circumstances. There is no singular geography associated with a community because several communities can coexist within one place or a single community can be spread across considerable space; thus I use ''community'' purposefully here and throughout this paper rather than ''neighborhood'' or ''locality'' or any other term that necessarily implies a real circumscription. In the case of a community that is spread across space, embeddedness in the community entails social, cultural, political, and economic roots and

connections in a network, not local tradition in a place. Nonlocal links often include the creation and development of nonspatially circumscribed "imagined" communities (Benedict Anderson 1991); these may be crucial for social movement organizations when local dominant powers preclude expressions of local minority communities (Don Mitchell 1998) or when a social movement organization strategically expands by linking with different yet related groups (Castells 1983; Noel Castree 2000; Byron A. Miller 2000; Bosco 2001, 2002; Andrew Herod 2001). The capacity to expand beyond a particular local or nonlocal community underscores the role of agency when local structural conditions might otherwise preclude voices of resistance.[25]

Yet, agency in our understanding of effective collective action finds expression through exchange and communication *outside* a (local or nonlocal) community, implicitly reinforcing the common emphasis on local social tradition or local embeddedness at the expense of intracommunity social change. Can efforts toward social change be effective when they are confined to a single issue and/or community? This may be important because a "little" change, which may be tactical and short-run, conceivably may evolve into "big," strategic, and long-term change if its dynamics are understood and fruitfully manipulated. Under what condition(s), then, can agency with*in* a group be tapped to effect change?

Relatively unexplored are the circumstances swaying individuals to voice discontent within a (local or nonlocal) community. At issue is the purposeful construction of collective action based on the identification and construction of linkages among individuals in conflict with community norms. From a normative vantage point, understanding and identifying individuals' unresolved cognitive dissonance may help identify potential activists who might otherwise continue a course of frustrated conformity. Importantly, the connection among different individuals' unresolved cognitive dissonances can be socially or environmentally constructive or destructive, and tapping them will have parallel results. A recognition of opportunities for negative change, again from a normative vantage point, thus is critical to thwarting destructive pathways. Consider, for example, the movement of immigrants into a community dominated by another ethnic group. Urban history reveals that such a movement typically leads to a myriad of legal and illegal discriminatory practices, and further, that formal regulations against such discrimination are ineffective (john a. powell 2002). What if conflicted actors within such communities were identified, tapped, linked, and positioned to express discontent via collective action? Recall the anecdote about Sue: under what conditions might Sue's discomfort with the racism in her community be tapped and connected with similar emotions of others to forestall local racist practices?

In other words, can agency be purposefully constructed and channeled into an outlet of collective action within a community under the panoptical

dominance of the mainstream? How? Does the uncommonness of this situation defeat the argument? I suggest that it is *possible* to activate agency, first by identifying people conflicted about community practices, and second by offering a forum for discussion that would establish links among those previously in covert dissension and, in so doing, render such dissension overt. Whereas strategies for developing networks are unexceptional, strategies for identifying covert dissenters remain relatively unexplored, perhaps in part because assumptions about homogeneity tend to dominate our perceptions of communities. Herein lies the heuristic value of recognizing individuals' incoherent consumer practices. Just as archaeologists develop inferences about behavioral processes on the basis of material and ecological culture, I suggest here an archaeology of social life through an analysis that identifies and contextualizes untidy consumer cultures. The contextualization component of such an analysis requires the examination, at one time and over time, of the different spheres of life from which people draw to construct their consumer cultures. Unlike the practice of archaeology, however, scholars in this type of project have access to far more than material and ecological culture; they can talk to and *with* people, individually and in groups, and they can consult documents to triangulate information, uncover discourse, and identify flux and tension in the system. Patterns of consumption, notably incoherent consumer cultures, offer potential clues to suppressed disarticulation. This said, the value here is heuristic, and researchers should be wary of presuming processes based on the identification of patterns; at issue is identifying information on which to base questions, not assumptions.

THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF *UN*CERTAINTY IN PRODUCTION

Whereas consumer practices tend to be understood as emotional, even while discounting individual variation in analyses of social patterning (Miller 1998), studies of production rarely consider emotion at all (Jon Elster 1998).[26] With the exception of fields such as behavioral economics, which burgeoned relatively recently in the 1990s, researchers generally have considered emotions taboo in the economy; they are supposed to be left at home, circumscribed by what is conventionally understood as private space.[27] Emotions commonly are considered to occupy a distinct sphere that is subject to management and control, either in the workplace or in consumer cultures, as advertisers consciously tap and manipulate emotions to insure a market for their products.[28] Exceptions, notably in the services sector, include certain jobs that require workers to play on others' emotions or the embedded expressions of sexuality in a gendered work system (Arlie R. Hochschild 1983; Linda McDowell and Gillian Court 1994). Yet, we all know intuitively that how people (such as those in the anecdote about

Maria) *feel* about their jobs or co-workers in the workplace can affect performance, regardless of the industry (Fineman 1993, 2000b). Aviad E. Raz (2002) has recently characterized organizations as emotional cauldrons. Indeed, Folbre (2001) has shown that ignoring feelings is, among other things, inefficient. Emotions can be critical to realizing different types of change in the workplace, whether enhanced competitiveness or social change via the effective mobilization of workers in formal protest (Ettlinger 2003). The discussion below focuses on how emotions are critical to developing or enhancing competitiveness, although the intent is to offer a conceptual framework applicable to many different types of change.

Boredom resulting from a managerial system that forestalls the development of workers' skills with routine and unchallenging work is likely to encourage complacency, if not carelessness. Too much pressure on workers can result in stress, resentment, and disloyalty that may reflect negatively in performance. While much research in the 1980s, for example, enthusiastically reported on new competitive strategies of flexible production (e.g., Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel 1984; Allen J. Scott 1988b), other voices attempted to mute the fervor for flexible production by expressing a concern for the deleterious effects of such flexibility on the workforce and, in turn, on competitiveness (Dennis Hayes 1989; Jamie Peck 1992). If work is unstable and workers are overworked and underpaid, can we expect loyalty from workers? Or if a job and the gender system in which it is embedded compels workers to develop sexual and other identities in the workplace that seriously conflict with their sense of self, can we expect consistency, commitment, and earnestness? The effects of resentment and disloyalty on quality, innovation, speediness, reliability, and overall efficiency indeed are likely to be negative. Performance evaluations conventionally chart, often quantitatively, quality, innovation, and so forth, and then call for improvements in these dimensions of work, but they often fail to explain *why* performance is suboptimal.

The simple idea that people will respond positively if they are treated positively counters the conventional economic wisdom of so-called ''rational man,'' which underscores people's opportunistic nature and thus the need for surveillance and control mechanisms to pressure people to work harder. Despite important differences in approach (e.g., Taylorism, continuous quality improvement), most managerial modes converge on the premise that workers will not ''perform'' unless they are pressured to do so, a premise shared by the different theories of rationality (bounded, unbounded, and selective, as in theories of labor market segmentation or *x*-efficiency) that implicitly drive these management styles.[29] Further, despite findings in a variety of contexts that worker discontent results in lower productivity (Harley Shaiken 1990; Glenn Bassett 1994; Jorge V. Carrillo 1995), there has been no systematic response in any context to accommodate workers' needs as an avenue towards competitiveness. This

lack of response is perhaps best explained by the tendency of employers to pursue competitive advantage along avenues of the cost, quality, and delivery of *products*, rather than along avenues pertaining to the quality of conditions for *workers*, which impacts products.

Considering *untried* frontiers of competitiveness potentially could improve productivity by developing a new avenue of competitive advantage to permit *convergence* of firm and worker well-being. Instead, firms routinely ignore the issue as they "follow the leader" in subscribing to variations of a paradigm of competitiveness that is product- rather than people-focused, despite claims otherwise. The "rational man" paradigm in the workplace results, in part, in managerial indifference to how people feel about their jobs. Consequently, managers unwittingly forfeit potential gains from increased productivity that may derive from workers' positive feelings about their job, employer, and workplace.

We might attribute the avoidance of issues of worker feelings by business practitioners as well as academicians to *their* emotions – to the anxiety of uncertainty that would prevail if competitive strategies seriously considered workers, their needs, and their feelings. Academicians studying workplaces are more comfortable focusing on product-related, rather than people-related, strategies. Similarly, it apparently makes more sense to employers to forgo profits derived from trusting people and insuring conscientious work and loyalty by accommodating their needs; instead employers place faith in what seems a certain solution, even if it may be suboptimal. The fear of losing a significant opportunity through mistaken judgment outweighs actual profit maximization. By "actual," I mean profit that includes the gains from workers' satisfaction with their jobs and work conditions. Profit maximization is only partially assessed because employers usually disregard these gains, reflecting the privileging of employers' (not employees') sentiments and feelings. Ironically, the reliance of employers on quantitative assessments of quality inadvertently sacrifices accurate inter-pretations of performance because these methods overlook complex, contingent, and unpredictable processes. Ethnographic research has shown that managerial information systems to monitor patterns of work and performance can misconstrue realities when a contextualized, nuanced understanding of the work processes and associated social relations is lacking (John A. Hughes, Jon O'Brien, Dave Randall, Mark Rouncefield, and Peter Tolmie 2001).

Let us consider *why* so much uncertainty exists in the workplace; that is, why making predictions about production processes and relations is impossible. To reiterate a point made at the outset, people – workers – carry and mix their thoughts and feelings across different spheres of life. How someone behaves in a workplace on a particular day may have little to do with workplace goals and circumstances and more to do with feelings that derive from one's relations at home, in one's neighborhood, or in some

spatially uncircumscribed place on the Internet, in communications with family, friends, professional, or avocational spheres. The fluidity of thoughts and feelings renders them unpredictable at any particular point in time, in a specific place.

The above said, an important exception exists whereby those with power in the business world not only recognize but use this fluidity across spheres (although academicians rarely include this in their examination of transactions). Specifically, those in power often use a contrived transference of thoughts and feelings to develop and finalize transactions. The classic American case is ''the deal'' initiated, for example, on a golf course and later cemented in an office. In this closed network of power, ''good old boys'' or girls consciously stage a (presumably positive) discussion and frame a (presumably positive) relationship in a setting outside the workplace for later use in the workplace. Although from a normative vantage point, I too am interested in purposeful change, the type of change in which I am interested is inclusive. Rarely does the understanding of the fluidity of thoughts and feelings across contexts figure in business practices designed to manage daily life in workplaces *across* axes of power, or up or down hierarchies.

Inattention to the broad geographic scope of individuals' thoughts and feelings also compounds the complexity of feelings in collaborative work, when different people with dissimilar thoughts and feelings at any one time need to work together productively. People may have different values that clash, negatively affecting the interaction and, quite likely, the final product. Although different values emanating from such contexts as home, school, and neighborhood may have no explicit relation to a workplace task or mission, they nonetheless play an important role in people's perceptions, behaviors, and interactions in workplaces. Indeed, people's values and sentiments that have evolved outside the workplace contribute considerably to the occupational segmentation in firms reflecting societal divides along axes of gender, age, ethnicity, and so on.[30] Significantly, interaction among people in firms is most productive when the people interacting share values and sentiments. Conversely, the clash of people's values may be an important element in explaining suboptimal productivity as well as the tension and flux within firms that outwardly claim a coherent culture. Research that has associated high turnover, instability, and conflict with increased diversity in workplaces (Frances J. Milliken and Luis L. Martins 1996) may inadvertently support efforts to minimize diversity, when the alternative might be to think normatively about institutionalizing mechanisms to sustain diversity while using conflict as an opportunity to come to terms with and transcend discriminatory behavior and trends.

Finally, whereas a lack of compatibility in co-workers' experiences outside a workplace may, in the absence of proactive management, negatively affect collaborative endeavors, recognizing people's *positive* shared experiences

outside a workplace (either in other workplaces or in nonwork-related community activities) could connect individuals or groups of people in fruitful, joint work-related activity. Such purposeful development of overlapping social networks across personal (often private) and professional (usually public) spheres of life would entail developing a fundamental understanding of how the flow of thoughts and feelings from one context to another affects the character and text of interactions; it would require a geographic interpretation of what Joyce K. Fletcher (1999) has called ''relational work'' (Ettlinger 2003).[31] Spatializing relational work by recognizing the relevance of, and connections among, contexts in different work spaces or outside the workplace clarifies the significance of social relations across overlapping social networks that reach across different spheres of life (workplace, home, residential neighborhood, nonlocal communities, and associations). Yet, purposeful strategies to constructively tap and connect people's feelings and experiences (across workplace, home, and other spaces) are rare in practice, perhaps because doing so would require stepping outside the bounds of what is conventionally understood as ''rational'' and ''professional,'' and would violate conventional public and private distinctions and boundaries. At present, such relational strategies stand as a normative agenda.

CONCLUSION

Whether in the realm of consumer cultures or in production systems, thoughts and feelings are more than a part of life: they constitute a pivotal component of individual behavior and performance as well as of social relations. Common exemplars of emotion such as love, happiness, anxiety, grief, and so on represent an essentialist interpretation of emotions that separates them from rationality and freezes them in time and space. Alternatively, as I have argued, emotions are continuous, that is, not contained in a place and in a moment; rather they move with an individual across contexts and mix with thoughts and feelings associated with other experiences. It is a mistake, then, to conceptualize emotions as add-on variables; at issue is how to integrate into analysis a subject that researchers conventionally consider discretely, if at all.

   I suggest that thoughts and feelings figure prominently in change, whether in a workplace, home, neighborhood, or nonspatially circumscribed community. Analysis of thoughts and feelings requires thinking about their spatiality, that is, about how the multiplicity and incoherence of a person's thoughts and feelings derive from different spheres of life over time and space. Although contexts certainly have boundaries, people traverse contexts, carrying thoughts and feelings with them, mixing thoughts and feelings derived from experiences in different contexts, thereby blurring boundaries. I have suggested that ignoring the multiple

logics associated with people's geographies of life and universes of interaction results in missed opportunities for change. Among the conceivably indefinite number of logics, analytically at issue is the particular set of blurred logics that surface in the particular context(s) under study.

Emotions in the workplace, specifically in production contexts, routinely are ignored both in business practice and in mainstream basic research. Despite this avoidance, a host of realities, such as suboptimal production, and tension and flux, asserts their presence. Further, neglecting emotions and their untidy geographies constitutes a critical barrier to maximizing competitiveness in both individual and collaborative performance; it also constitutes a barrier to the potential convergence of firm and *worker* well-being. Towards this end, avenues of change require dialogue and discussion between employers and employees regarding individuals' unmet needs, as well as an understanding of how and why workers clash, and how to forge avenues toward fruitful collaboration, potentially by tapping people's overlapping social networks that may extend beyond a single workplace to other workplaces or outside workplaces altogether. Such employer–employee exchange is rare, in part due to the presumption of a singular rationality. The rarity of such exchange is also due to the power differentials that lace human relations. Recognizing multiple logics and their evolution across time and space may be an important step toward negotiating the structures of power.

Interestingly, we find that the production–consumption relation rests a great deal on the tapping and manipulation of thoughts and feelings. Yet avoidance arises here, too, notably in individuals' multiple logics, which result in cognitive dissonance. The geographies of this psychology pertain to the different contexts or spheres of life from which different logics, identities, and values emanate, and that are connected socially by overlapping social networks. Avoidance of conflictive realities within and across those networks and the spheres that contextualize them obscures how social change occurs or can occur. On the one hand, one can trigger negative change by tapping and playing on individuals' covert feelings that are socially or environmentally destructive; conversely, and thinking normatively, the purposeful tapping of covert discontent with destructive behaviors may help thwart socially and/or environmentally pernicious practices. Although effective collective action eventually requires coalitions and often some collaboration with institutionalized authority, identifying and positively harnessing individuals' frustrated thoughts and feelings about specific issues may be a step towards the construction of a new, shared rationality with the potential for engendering change.

The movement from a recognition of the importance of emotions in our lives to normative thought requires an analytical fluidity that permits thinking about both context-specific processes and mobile, mutable processes that reach across time and space. At issue is the *relation* between

the two. Circumscribed context matters as much as the movement between such contexts when interpreting incoherence relative to its untidy geographies. The emphasis on incoherence here is a critical reaction to the problems of focusing on dominant patterns, but an understanding of dominant patterns remains important. Indeed, dominant patterns and processes of variation are equally important; at issue is their relation because it is the harnessing of conflicted energy that potentially may alter the patterns.

POSTSCRIPT ON THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF COMPLEMENTARY MODES OF ANALYSIS

The concluding sentence above suggests that both pattern- and process-oriented analyses are important because, from a normative perspective, it is their relation that is critical. This paper is not, then, about replacing one type of analysis with another; it offers instead a process-oriented framework drawn from a nexus of poststructuralist, feminist, economic, cultural, and geographic lenses to complement pattern-oriented analyses.

  Pattern-oriented analyses have long dominated the social sciences; process-oriented analyses represent a minority. The implicit power relation of majority/minority places the burden of persuasion for complementarity principally on the minority alternatives.[32] That said, the articulation of the two modes of analyses is very much in question. Julie Nelson (2001), who also sees process- and pattern-oriented modes of analysis as complementary, nonetheless has commented that complementarities can be framed negatively or positively. Yet even with constructive intentions, Roger E. Backhouse's (1995) response to Amariglio and Ruccio's (1995) discussion of uncertainty is instructive. Backhouse comments that although ''post'' arguments are reasonable, they can only be suggestive to mainstream social scientists, principally because they lack blueprints for how mainstream social scientists can use the ideas. In practice, it is unlikely that people will abandon the modes of thought and analysis in which they are invested and for which they are routinely rewarded without a formal requirement to do so; by virtue of being in the majority, they experience little incentive or pressure for change. (By ''change,'' I mean a change that opens up mainstream analyses to consider alternative perspectives for complementarities; at issue is not turning the table, but rather making it round.) Further, it is unlikely that mainstream social scientists can incorporate fundamentally different perspectives into their analyses if, as I argue in this paper, such perspectives require different lenses to interpret realities as opposed to putting forward variables to add onto an existing analysis. Although others have made clear *why* alternative approaches are valuable to mainstream social scientists (Dow and Hillard 1995; Fred F. Foldvary 1996; Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen 1999; Stephen Cullenberg,

Jack Amariglio, and David F. Ruccio 2001), it remains undecided *how* such alternatives may be used.

From a policy perspective, Paul Davidson (1995) has suggested that economists engaged in predictive modeling can benefit from thinking about uncertainty by recognizing *when* predictive models are inappropriate and thereby adapt policies to context-specific circumstances at appropriate times. This is an interesting perspective in part because it does not require that people change their modes of analysis in absolute terms. Although unaddressed in his article, we might imagine that, in practice, different people with different research experiences might coordinate analyses; that is, particular researchers need not divest themselves of their cumulative research training and experience. From this vantage point, complementary modes of analyses are about inclusion, not exclusion, and fundamentally about cooperative research. Of course, the danger here pertains to possible power imbalances: if two modes of analyses indicate different outcomes with different policy implications, which will prevail? Or stated in terms of the agents, the people, behind the analyses, who wins?[33] The answer, from the point of view of this paper, is no one, if we frame the question in terms of power imbalances. Alternatively, we can frame the question in terms of a partnership that requires all invested parties to consider the value of a check on their own thinking and to work toward a new understanding informed by alternative ideas (where ''alternative'' signifies ''different'' rather than a ''minority'' or less powerful or pervasive perspective). This is not a facile solution; the requirements are huge and necessitate an appreciation of Haraway's (1997) crucial point about ''the science question'': recognizing the limits and partiality of our knowledge is the condition for, not the denial of, objectivity. Embracing this perspective requires recognizing that values are either implicitly or explicitly embedded in all research, and further, it requires valuing ethics as well as efficiency.

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NOTES

[1] By ''consumer culture'' I refer to the daily-life dynamics of consumer society. As I elaborate later in the paper, different theorists posit different views of ''culture.'' Whereas I view culture as dynamic, an essentialist view of culture would homogenize culture and consider it as static, as in *the* US, Japanese, or Latin American ''culture.''

[2] Whereas poststructuralists understand power in reference to individuals' agency in everyday life, structuralists tend to view power as something exerted *over* victims, often at a more macro-scale level of analysis.

[3] See also critiques of Foucault's work and how it changed over time from structuralist to poststructuralist (Mitchell Dean 1994; Joanne P. Sharp, Paul Routledge, Chris Philo, and Ronan Paddison 2000).

[4] Of relevance here is that in the 1990s interest in a cultural approach to analyzing production (notably in economic geography) coincided with the development of interest in a variety of forms of production organization, beyond the Fordist/post-Fordist binary (Ash Amin 1994). New approaches have focused on nontraditional organization, perhaps better stated as forms of organization outside traditional study (Linda McDowell and Gillian Court 1994; Gernot Grabher and David Stark 1997; Nigel Thrift 1999). Thus relatively little is known about issues of flux or tension in what have been conceptualized as traditional forms of organization.

[5] One caveat: my purpose in this brief critique of the cultural industries and consumer cultures literature is not to offer a comprehensive review (see, for example, Daniel Miller 1987; Grant D. McCracken 1988; Scott Lash and John Urry 1994; Celia Lury 1996; Don Slater 1997; Tim Edwards 2000; Allen J. Scott 2000), but rather to succinctly position my perspective, even as I recognize that not all research and researchers fit easily into discrete boxes.

[6] Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1993) of the Frankfurt School earlier conceptualized culture industries as a form of social control over mass consumption. This perspective has since been criticized for its determinism and neglect of human agency.

[7] See Anne McClintock (1994) on the general notion of commodified racism, though not specifically applied to automobiles in the United States. As discussed later in this section, ''high riders'' and ''low riders'' are examples of the racist implications of automobile production and consumption.

[8] Although Florida's earlier work, in the context of post-Fordist industry, focused on the role of creativity, among other things, in manufacturing, his later work, in the context of the cultural industries literature, has confined creativity to select, so-called ''cultural'' industries (Florida 1996, 2002). He does not address the change in perspective in his work; rather, the change appears to reflect implicitly the different trends of which his work has been a part.

[9] Social movements dubbed ''new'' are those associated with the politics of identity rather than class (Steven M. Buechler 1995). However, the large number of social movements from the past directly associated with identity politics renders the idea of new and old social movements tenuous (David Plotke 1995); further, political economy and identity politics are not mutually exclusive (Nancy Fraser 1999; Iris M. Young 2000).

[10] Although poststructuralism is in many ways a critical reaction to grand theory, which applies theory across contexts, it is not necessarily relativist. Non-essentialism, for example, acts as a counter to totalizing frameworks; at the same time, one can apply non-essentialist principles to any context.

[11] Specifically regarding philosophical aesthetics, Martha Woodmansee (1994) explicitly challenged linear models of history while also challenging the idea of the arts as separate from other dimensions of life.

[12] The SUV in the United States exemplifies how a commodity (an automobile, in this case) can be produced and marketed as a symbol of imagined places. Television commercials suggest that one can go anywhere in these high-sport, high-adventure vehicles, and this marketing slant is especially successful with the many Americans (notably, though not exclusively, white men) in white suburbs who drive their SUVs to the neighborhood swimming pool, the shopping mall, and the local football game. SUVs are marketed as a way to change one's geography from enclave to an imagined anywhere. SUVs, and people's emotions and behavior associated with them, are a remarkable present-day example of what Colin Campbell (1987) analyzed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in his theorization of modern consumerism; for a more contemporary discussion of how products both respond to and produce people's anxieties and insecurities, see, for example, David Knights and Andrew Sturdy (1997).

[13] Drucilla Barker offered a notable set of references on the listserve of the International Association for Feminist Economics, < iaffe-l@lists.carleton.ca > , on July 7, 2003, that recognize and clarify how and why gender in economics prompts reconceptualization and not an extra variable. Her list includes: Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson (1993); Lourdes Benería (1995); Edith Kuiper, Jolande Sap, Notburga Ott, Zafiris Tzanatos, and Susan Feiner (1995); Drucilla Barker and Edith Kuper (2003); Drucilla K. Barker and Susan Feiner (forthcoming).

[14] Stephen Fineman (2000a) defines ''social constructivism'' in terms of the socio-cultural contexts that engender rules and vocabularies of emotion.

[15] Paul du Gay (1996) is well known for emphasizing the blurring of boundaries, especially regarding production and consumption. He has argued that people's identities are not formed in one context; in particular, he has challenged the idea that identity formation occurs specifically in the workplace. That said, I concur with Marek Korczynski (2002: 50), who points out that du Gay's analysis is inconsistent with his claims and that the analysis commits the same error he intended to challenge.

[16] Some notable essentialist treatments of emotion include Robert Frank's (1988) *Passions Within Reason* and Jon Elster's (1999) *Alchemies of the Mind*. Also, despite presentations of Martha C. Nussbaum as non-essentialist, her recent book *Upheavals of Thought* (2001) specifically focused on the role of emotions in social change and in so doing reduced emotions to and circumscribed them by ''love'', ''compassion'' and so forth; she argued normatively that emotions (understood *a priori* as distinct from rationality) *should* be mixed with rationality.

[17] Examples of such frameworks from the poststructuralist literature include actor network theory, or ANT (John Law and John Hassard 1999), ''the social life of things'' (Arjun Appadurai 1986; Daniel Miller 2001), and ''schizoanalysis'' (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 1983).

[18] The reification of networks is common in network analysis, including ANT, and generally is common in the analysis of interorganizational (notably interfirm) interaction. The concept ''relational capital'' (Ikujiro Nonaka 1994; Prashant Kale, Harbir Singh, and Howard Perlmutter 2000) is useful in this regard because it focuses on inter*personal* rather than inter*organizational* interaction.

[19] Places and spaces can be symbolic, and thus I am not suggesting here a simple binary whereby geography refers to the material and symbolism refers to thoughts and feelings. The point is that the symbolic requires connection with that which is being symbolized.

[20] Slater (1997: 87) has recognized that individuals can change their lifestyles ''in the move from one shop window, TV channel, supermarket shelf and so on to another.'' That said, he goes on to observe that identity is only skin deep because of people's fickleness and the possibility of identity change at a whim (Slater 1997: 88). In contrast, I suggest that while such fickleness is possible, people don't necessarily change identities but rather are constituted concurrently by multiple identities that they use consciously and unconsciously to navigate situations and relationships, and to avoid uncertainty. Further, these multiple identities are not always discrete, but rather become interwoven (sometimes creating problems or conflict for people, not to mention difficulty for researchers!) as people carry and mix their thoughts and feelings across contexts.

[21] Although Festinger's (1957) original formulation has been modified significantly, most revisions accept the fundamental idea that dissonance is resolved; revisions differ principally regarding the motivations underlying dissonance effects (Eddie Harmon-Jones and Judson Mills 1999).

[22] Scott (1988a) specifies an urban geography of lifestyles and social reproduction in connection with divisions of labor in and among firms in a metropolis.

[23] My perspective on change in consumer cultures resonates with Mansbridge's (2001) ''oppositional consciousness'' in several ways. She also sees reason and emotion as entwined, and further, she also recognizes individuals' multiple senses of identity derived from different experiences. That said, her central question focuses on the consciousness of a (disempowered) group defined by others on the basis, for example, of class, race, gender, and so forth, and how people in that group connect on the basis of what they are being discriminated against; my concern is with identity based on an individual's *view* – one's thoughts and feelings related to the history and mixing of experiences – about something such as race, class, and so forth, irrespective of whether one is a member of the group being discriminated against.

[24] As an institutionalized authority, the state is often discussed as an especially useful actor in establishing foundational citizen rights, although other forms of governance also are possible.

[25] Studies of collective action (see Castells 1983; Mitchell 1998; Bosco 2001) have clarified the role of agency relative to structure, following and in part critically reacting to Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward's (1977) seminal yet decidedly structuralist study.

[26] Studies of emotion loom large in psychology, but these studies rarely examine emotions specifically in production contexts with the exception of the recent literature in behavioral economics and organizational psychologists' work on ''emotional intelligence'' (on which I elaborate later in this paper).

[27] Spaces conventionally understood as private can, however, be public, and vice versa (Lynn A. Staeheli 1996).

[28] As pointed out by Aviad E. Raz (2002) in his comparative study of emotion in workplace cultures in Japan and America, the general presumption about the separation of the public and private spheres characterizes Western thinking in particular. That said, the context*less* character of neoclassical thinking has been diffused worldwide in academe, irrespective of contextual variation. With this understanding, we might expect neoclassicists in Japan to study workplaces similarly to the way US neoclassicists study workplaces, even though assumptions about emotions among the actors (e.g., managers, employees) in Japan and the United States may differ.

[29] Regarding bounded rationality, see Herbert A. Simon (1957), and for a comprehensive review, see John Conlisk (1996); regarding rationality in the context of labor market segmentation, see Michael J. Piore (1979) and especially Charles F. Sabel (1979); regarding rationality in terms of x-efficiency, see Harvey Leibenstein (1978).

[30] See, for example, McDowell and Court (1994) and Barbara F. Reskin and Irene Padavic (1994) for different approaches (poststructuralist and political economy, respectively) to occupational segregation by gender.

[31] One should not confuse Fletcher's (1999) ''relational work'' with the literature from social psychology on ''emotional intelligence'' (Daniel Goleman 1995, 1998; Reuven Bar-On and James D. A. Parker 2000; Joseph Ciarrochi, Joseph P. Forgas, and John D. Mayer 2001), which has been discussed specifically in terms of developing emotional competence in the workplace through relationships (Kathy E. Kram and Cary Cherniss 2001). Although Fletcher recognizes the importance of individual and social ''emotional intelligence,'' she emphasizes that workplace relations are laced with power. Whereas relational thinking in the emotional intelligence literature suggests, for example, that effective leadership enhances group performance, Fletcher (1999: 124–5) calls attention to the one-sided nature of leadership and related concepts (e.g., organizational learning, decision-making); some of her suggestions for enhanced performance regarding leadership entail questioning assumptions and hierarchical logic concretely by instituting rotating leadership, encouraging continuous teaching as well as continuous learning, empowering others, and so forth. Relational thinking in the emotional intelligence literature is fixed in a hierarchical logic, but it is fluid in Fletcher's design, which is sensitive to the power relations that can preclude relational effectiveness. That said, Fletcher's work remains geographically fixed at the workplace, thereby skirting the significance of social relations across overlapping social networks that extend different spheres of life.

[32] The uneven burden of persuasion is exemplified by informal requirements that principal investigators of research projects supported by public social science funding organizations justify a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative approach, whereas the converse is not expected.

[33] As Robert Wade and his colleagues have argued in their critiques of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, policy institutions are not value-neutral by virtue of the people who constitute these institutions and the practices of power in which they engage to censor alternative perspectives (Robert Wade 1996; Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso 1998).

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